Joshua Clymer, Jonah Weinbaum, Robert Kirk, Kimberly Mai, Selena Zhang, Xander Davies
Existing evaluations of AI misuse safeguards provide a patchwork of evidence that is often difficult to connect to real-world decisions. To bridge this gap, we describe an end-to-end argument (a “safety case”) that misuse safeguards reduce the risk posed by an AI assistant to low levels. We first describe how a hypothetical developer red teams safeguards, estimating the effort required to evade them.Then, the developer plugs this estimate into a quantitative “uplift model” to determine how much barriers introduced by safeguards dissuade misuse (https://www.aimisusemodel.com/). This procedure provides a continuous signal of risk during deployment that helps the developer rapidly respond to emerging threats.Finally, we describe how to tie these components together into a simple safety case.Our work provides one concrete path – though not the only path – to rigorously justifying AI misuse risks are low.